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Introduction 
 
The doi moi or “Renovation” programme of political and economic reforms was 
introduced by the Vietnamese Congress in 1986. This policy decentralised aspects of 
governance and planning and streamlined the government bureaucracy. Reforms were 
enacted to promote the private sector as an economic driver, and to permit state and 
privately-owned industries to trade directly in foreign and international markets. Doi moi 
has been extremely successful in transforming Vietnam from a stagnant, unstable, 
centrally planned Soviet-style economy to a dynamic and quickly growing market-
oriented economy grounded in a socialist society (Kokko, 1998, p. 2). Events such as the 
end of the US trade embargo on Vietnam in 1994 and Vietnam’s 1995 entry into 
ASEAN, as well as Vietnam’s admission into the World Trade Organization (WTO) at 
the beginning of 2007, indicate an increasing re-integration of Vietnam into international 
capitalist markets. The United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) and the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have been involved in assisting 
Vietnam in developing a tourism policy and a tourism master plan to impose some 
organisation on this still-emerging market, as well as helping to draft the country’s first 
ever tourism law. 
Before the open door policy doi moi, the Vietnamese government had 
monopolised all tourism sectors. In 1987, one year after doi moi, the state issued the Law 
on Foreign Investment, which encouraged foreign direct investment in Vietnam, 
especially in the tourism industry. Parallel to the rush of foreign investment that 
followed, private enterprises also increased in number, leading to the end of the 
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government monopoly in provision of tourism services, although the government still 
owns a large number of hotels. Under these new circumstances, state-owned enterprises 
have had to reinvent themselves for the first time to survive in an open market where 
competition is fierce.  
These political and economic changes have increased Vietnam’s accessibility and 
attractiveness in the international tourism market, causing tourists from around the world 
to rediscover Vietnam. Consequently, Vietnam’s tourism industry has experienced a 
period of meteoric growth in recent years. The number of foreign tourists visiting the 
country grew from 92,500 in 1988 to 3,583,486 in 2006 (Vietnam National 
Administration of Tourism [VNAT], 2007). According to UNDP/WTO, Vietnam’s 
tourism turnover in 1989 was about US$ 140 million, and direct employment in the 
tourism industry accounted for 8,000 jobs (Economist Intelligence Unit [EIU], 1993, p. 
63). A 2001 estimate stated the nation’s earnings from tourism as US$2.6 billion (Sadi & 
Henderson, 2001, p. 70). In 2006, there were 234,000 people employed directly in 
tourism jobs in Vietnam and 510,000 whose jobs indirectly depended on tourism (John, 
2006). According to World Travel and Tourism Council and Oxford Economic 
Forecasting, Vietnam’s tourism sector is expected to experience the sixth-highest growth 
rate of countries in the world between 2007 and 2016 (“Vietnam’s Tourism Grows,” 
2006). Aside from this quantifiable growth, tourism in Vietnam also continues to change 
in character. New tourism niches, new types of tourism attractions and enterprises and 
new kinds of tourists have been appearing in Vietnam since 1986. Doi moi is an ongoing 
process that is reflected in all aspects of the Vietnamese society, economy and politics. 
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Position and Methodology 
 
This paper presents two primary positions: (1) changes in the tourism accommodation 
sector in Vietnam since the beginning of the doi moi programme have been characterised 
and, to a certain extent, driven by the dynamic interactions between state-owned 
enterprises, foreign direct investment and domestic private operators in this sector, and 
(2) these changes are linked to the political, social and economic changes occurring in 
Vietnam within this period of transition. To articulate these positions in detail, the author 
has divided the development of Vietnam’s accommodation market since the beginning of 
doi moi in 1986 into five periods, each of which represents a distinct stage in the 
development of the two above-mentioned historical narratives (“bracketed” in this paper 
by the pre-1986 state preceding doi moi and the current developments and future 
outlook). 
This research incorporates a series of interviews conducted by the lead author 
with administrative figures in two international hotel chains, seven state owned hotels 
and three guesthouses at different locations in Vietnam. These were supplemented with 
interviews with a senior expert in hotels from the Vietnam National Administration of 
Tourism (VNAT) and a senior official of the Foreign Investment Agency, Ministry of 
Planning and Investment (MPI). 
Because the research aims at understanding change over a period of years, one 
criterion for the identification of interviewees was the length of time that they had been 
continuously operating in the Vietnamese tourism sector. Firms, organisations and 
individuals that have been active in Vietnam tourism from before doi moi were the most 
valuable sources of information in this respect, because of their ability to see patterns 
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over a longer period of time, in some cases since before the beginning of doi moi. Since 
the state had a monopoly on tourism businesses before 1986, the longest-established 
hotels and firms are by nature government-owned. Thus, mostly state-owned hotels and 
tour operators were targeted for interviews. For private and foreign actors, such as SMEs 
(Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises) and FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) firms, 
interviewees were chosen from firms that have been established since the early days of 
doi moi and which have experienced the full history of the development of private and 
FDI enterprises in Vietnam tourism. Interviews with representatives of government 
bodies were sought in order to understand changes in tourism policy from the point of 
view of those charged with its formulation and enforcement. While these criteria were 
applied to the prioritisation of certain potential interviewees over others, it was not 
always possible to gain access to the first-choice interviewees. Thus, a degree of 
flexibility had to be exercised in replacing filling-in for desired but inaccessible 
interviews. 
The author strove to verify and corroborate interview results by addressing issues 
through multiple lines of questioning aimed at different interviewees at different levels or 
sectors, such as the interviewing of representatives of the VNAT as well as private, state-
owned and international operators in the accommodation sector. Interviews with 
representatives of government bodies often served the purpose of verifying the findings 
obtained from other primary sources such as interviews with representatives of tourism 
businesses. 
 
Significance of the study 
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As a still-developing destination, Vietnam has not been the subject of much research in 
the area of tourism. Literature on accommodation in Vietnam and tourism development 
overall is particularly scarce. Thus, this study makes a contribution to a body of tourism 
research that is still in its early stages by proposing a cognitive structure to articulate past, 
present and future developments in the Vietnamese accommodation sector. The 
periodisation laid-out in this paper contributes to the articulation of a history of tourism in 
this country and provides a reflection on the nature of the forces and mechanisms that 
shape and direct accommodation development, which may be drawn on to inform 
decision-making within this sector. 
A great deal of the literature that has been published to date on tourism in 
Vietnam is based on secondary data. This paper integrates this literature with primary 
data collected by the author, enriching the literature available to future researchers. 
Because the government of Vietnam is of a different type than those of typical 
developed tourism destinations, the research adds to the body of knowledge on the effects 
of regime type on tourism development patterns. Particularly, there are also opportunities 
for comparison or transferral of knowledge and models from the Vietnamese context to 
understand possible or actual patterns of tourism development in other transition 
economies, such as those of the formerly communist nations of Eastern Europe. 
 
Pre-1986: Pre-Doi Moi 
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French-style accommodation and gastronomy characterised the hospitality facilities for 
tourists to pre-War Vietnam. Much of the physical infrastructure of the colonial tourism 
facilities suffered physical damage in the American War, and the demand for luxurious 
accommodation was much less after the War than in the colonial era, due to the low 
buying power of the domestic tour groups and Eastern European visitors who accounted 
for the majority of Vietnam’s tourists after the reunification. Consequently, between 1975 
and 1988, the significance of French accommodation and cuisine declined to a great 
extent (EIU, 1993, p. 62). The old resorts built during the French era had been aimed 
primarily at weekend breaks or very short stays, inspired by middle-class European 
models. These hotels were not up to the standards of the international tourists who once 
again began coming to Vietnam after 1986, since most of these hotels lacked any 
recreational or entertainment facilities beyond beds and food service (United Nations 
Development Programme [UNDP], 1991, p. 22), and some had been converted to other 
uses or had fallen into disrepair.  
 
Period 1: 1986-early 1990: Period of state dominance and the first joint ventures 
 
During the communist era until doi moi, the government was the sole owner of 
accommodation in Vietnam. During the early years of doi moi, most hotels still belonged 
to the State and were of a generally low standard. At the beginning of this period, most 
tourists to Vietnam still came from countries of the communist economic bloc 
COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) and did not demand a high 
standard of accommodation, nor could most of them have afforded international standard 
hotel prices. Most accommodation facilities in Vietnam were traditionally state-owned, 
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with the VNAT, provincial and city tourism enterprises and various ministries and state 
agencies running the majority of hotels (Vietnam National Administration of Tourism 
[VNAT], 2001, p. 40). Because foreign joint ventures were not yet operating in Vietnam, 
the state-owned hotels were not experiencing any competition within the accommodation 
market. 
The UNDP/WTO calculated Vietnam’s 1989 tourism earnings as around US$ 140 
million, and estimated that 8,000 people were directly employed in the tourism industry 
(EIU, 1993, p. 63). The Vietnamese government decreed 1990 as “Visit Vietnam Year”, 
in hopes of encouraging tourism to the country. However, this programme was deemed 
largely a failure by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), which cited a shortage of hotel 
rooms, suitable tourist facilities, services and airline seats as contributing factors (1993, 
p. 63). At the outset of the 1990s, there was very little accommodation of international 
standard in Vietnam (VNAT, 2001, p. 39). In 1990, the UNDP and WTO document 
counted only 1,565 international standard rooms in the whole country (UNDP, 1991, p. 
20). It became evident that the quality and quantity of Vietnam’s tourism infrastructure 
and amenities were not sufficient to meet the expectations of the international tourism 
market. Without the knowledge and money needed to bring about a transformation of the 
country’s tourism industry, the Vietnamese government was compelled to end its 
monopoly on tourism. With raised awareness of the importance of adequate infrastructure 
to tourism development, the Vietnamese government began measures to encourage joint 
ventures in tourism to lure foreign firms to invest in development in Vietnam (EIU, 1993, 
p. 63). 
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The 200-room Saigon Floating Hotel was a pioneering FDI-funded joint-venture 
hotel in Vietnam. It was built in Australia and towed across the ocean to Ho Chi Minh 
City. It opened in December 1989 and was operated by Southern Pacific Hotels as a joint 
venture between Australian and Filipino partners and the Vietnamese Overseas Finance 
and Trade Corporation (OCFC) (Abbott & Abbott, 1996, p. 193; Travel Business 
Analyst, 1992, p. 19), becoming the only five-star international standard hotel in the city. 
The Floating Hotel was the only accommodation establishment in Ho Chi Minh City 
offering features such as an international booking service, international direct dial phone 
lines, international booking, a business centre and credit card facilities. By 1990, seventy-
five percent of the Floating Hotel’s rooms were rented long-term to expatriates (EIU, 
1993, p. 68; Saigontourist, 1990, p. 31). 
 
Period 2: 1990-1994: Rise of joint venture hotels 
 
Beginning in 1990, there was significant growth in the accommodation sector, spurred by 
the Vietnamese government’s relinquishment of its monopoly and the opening-up of the 
market to foreign investment. State enterprises no longer held a monopoly and private 
and foreign investors began to become involved. Because of the increasing number of 
foreign business travellers to Vietnam, at the beginning of 1990 there was a shortage of 
international standard hotel rooms in Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi. Foreign joint venture 
hotels began to be established to fill this niche. By the end of this period, two large 
international hotels had been established in Hanoi and five in Ho Chi Minh City. In this 
period, hotel room prices and occupancy rates became very high. The entry of 
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international standard hotels into the market brought competitors to state-owned 
accommodation for the first time, requiring them to re-evaluate and revise their 
businesses to remain competitive. During these years, many state-owned hotels 
underwent renovation, sanitation and expansion. 
The accommodation shortage at the beginning of the 1990s made it possible for 
five-star joint venture hotels such as the Century Saigon to charge US$ 200 per night, 
while a visitor could pay US$ 300 for a room at the Saigon Floating Hotel. Even with 
these high prices, the room occupancy rate was very high and potential visitors to 
Vietnam were warned to make prior reservations (Antoine, 1992; “Foreign Investors,” 
1991, p. 19). The Floating Hotel’s General Manager at the time reported occupancy rates 
between 80 and 100 percent consistently for two years (McKinnon, 1993, p. 17). The 
Pullman Metropole Hotel in Hanoi, reopened in 1992, reported an average occupancy 
rate of 90 percent (Antoine, 1992) during the same period.  
Other hotel openings followed. In 1992, the joint venture Century Saigon Hotel 
opened with an Average Room Rate (ARR) of US$ 108 (similar to the Floating Hotel’s 
ARR of US$ 110) and had an occupancy rate of 75 percent in its first half-year of 
operation. These rates exceeded those of state-owned accommodation providers such as 
the Rex Hotel (US$ 60 per night), the Continental (US$ 85), the Saigon Star (US$ 78), 
the Norfolk (US$ 75) and the Chains First Hotel (US$ 43) (Militante, 1993). The Century 
Saigon hotel aimed at an ARR of US$ 123 for 1993 and US$ 138 for 1994 (ibid.) and the 
low supply of four and five-star hotels in Vietnam in the early 1990s enabled such hotels 
to charge US$ 150 a night by 1993 (Michael, 1993). 
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A joint venture between a state-owned enterprise and a Hong Kong investor 
opened the 14-storey, 552-room New World Saigon Hotel in 1994. The hotel had what 
were possibly the first escalators in Saigon. Because the project was self-financed, it 
avoided the ban on syndicated loans imposed by the US trade embargo. The Hong Kong 
investor New World contributed three-quarters of the US$ 62.5 million budget, with 
Saigontourist Holding Company making up the remainder (Michael, 1993). 
The domestic private accommodation market in Vietnam also grew quickly 
during over these years, enabled by access to small plots of land and alternative funding 
sources. By 1992, nearly half of the 2,756 hotels in Vietnam were private enterprises 
(EIU, 1993, p. 63). These hotels were almost exclusively small-scale, low budget 
operations, catering primarily to the “backpacker” independent traveller niche, and did 
not compete directly with larger state-owned of foreign-owned hotels. 
A grading system for hotels was among the legal regulations for tourism 
accommodation passed in 1992, but the ‘star’ system of hotel classification was not put 
into actual practice by the VNAT until 1994 according to a government official. The 
system applies only to hotels catering to foreign tourists and is based on a ranking of one 
to five stars. Although hotels are required to be graded, a lack of VNAT staff is hindering 
the full implementation of the system (VNAT, 2001, p. 41). 
In 1993 government plans to increase the number of international standard rooms 
in Vietnam from 4,000 to 9,000 by the end of 1995 were deemed insufficient to meet the 
requirements of the expected tourism growth in that time, as the number of tourists by 
1994 had already reached a million, double the number forecast by the government (Mok 
& Lam, 1996, p. 32). The Vietnamese Investment Review, quoted in McDowell, reported 
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that a number of Vietnamese tour agencies would sell package tours during these years 
without even having the necessary hotel rooms available (McDowell, 1994). However, 
these high occupancy rates apparently applied only to Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, as 
lack of proper tourism planning allowed over-development of accommodation provisions 
in some areas at the same time that Vietnam’s two biggest cities were experiencing a 
severe shortage. Haiphong, for example, reported low occupancy rates during the same 
period (EIU, 1993, p. 68) and Theuns (1997, p. 308) has written that parts of the country 
away from Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City had average occupancy rates of about 20-50 
percent. 
Since the Vietnamese government and domestic sector did not possess the 
expertise or the finances to drive development in the hospitality sector unassisted, the 
State Committee for Cooperation and Investment (SCCI) approved many foreign 
investment proposals for hotel development (EIU, 1993, p. 63). According to a Senior 
Official of the Foreign Investment Agency (FIA) of the Ministry of Planning and 
Investment (MPI), established foreign accommodation chains brought in their own loyal 
customers, thus attracting foreign exchange income into the country. Priority was given 
the refurbishment of existing hotels to bring them up to international standards. In terms 
of funds invested, hotel renovations were among the largest joint venture projects 
(Theuns, 1997, p. 314). 
During this period, hotel development accounted for between 57.5 and 99.4 
percent of the yearly total FDI in tourism (Erramilli, Luu, Gilbert, & Hooi, 1997, p. 280). 
Together with oil/gas and industry, hotel development was one of three major investment 
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areas that cumulatively accounted for up to 83 percent of total foreign investment in 1992 
(EIU, 1993, p. 63). 
 
Period 3: 1995-1996: reaction of state hotels 
 
The increasing number of joint venture hotels posed a challenge for existing state-owned 
hotels, which had to adjust to competitors in the market that they had monopolised before 
doi moi. State-owned hotels also had to come to terms with the needs and demands of the 
Western tourists who began to make up an increasing proportion of their customer base. 
For example, the Dan Chu Hotel in Ho Chi Minh City receives around 75 percent foreign 
guests and 25 percent domestic. Many of these hotels previously catered to guests from 
Eastern bloc countries: a market with lower expectations but a market that had dwindled 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Many older urban hotels replaced their 
Vietnamese names by restoring the Western-sounding names they had borne in the pre-
communist era before 1975 (Travel Business Analyst, 1992 p. 26), in an attempt to 
appeal to the foreign market. 
Some hotels supplemented their reservation departments with sales or marketing 
departments.  Around this time, state-owned hotels began to accept credit cards. All of 
these changes were undertaken concurrent with the withdrawal of government financial 
support for state-owned hotels. The Deputy General Manager of a state-owned hotel in 
Hanoi related that guest-oriented thinking was a new concept to her hotel’s management 
in 1993. Before that, an undersupply of hotel rooms had virtually assured hotels of 
sufficient occupancy, and the government could be counted on to provide subsidies. 
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Increasing competition and the disappearance of government support were among the 
factors that inspired the hotel to begin to accept credit cards in 1995 (Respondent, Hotel 
A, personal communication, June 30, 2004).  
In 1995, the Majestic Hotel in Ho Chi Minh City became the first state-owned 
hotel to open a sales department, as a reaction to the burgeoning success of joint-venture 
competitors such as the Floating Hotel and Omni Saigon Hotels. Such joint-venture 
hotels provided both an imperative and an example for the introduction of more 
progressive management thinking by their state-owned competitors. Although in an 
interviewed a government official denied that joint-venture hotels have had any effect on 
state-owned hotels, the Director of Sales and Marketing of one state-owned hotel has 
openly stated that he had learned about pricing and promotion from the hotel’s joint-
venture rivals. The discrepancy between these declarations may be indicative of the 
degree of autonomy that has been assumed by state-owned hotels, which must deal with 
problems of which government may not even be aware. 
Also during these years, domestic private entrepreneurs began to do business 
serving the independent tourist ‘backpacker’ market, which was disparaged by state-
owned operators, who did not consider independent tourists a significant market sector 
and did not see small private operators as a threat or competitor. In contrast, all of the 
seven representatives of state-owned hotels interviewed already saw joint venture hotels 
as direct threats and competitors within the market sectors to which the state 
accommodation sector aspired. 
 
Period 4: 1996-1999: Oversupply and falling demand 
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Accommodation occupancy rates in Vietnam were high in the mid-1990s. Around 1996, 
the overall hotel occupancy rate in Hanoi was 85-90 percent (Theuns, 1997, p. 308), 
however, several factors contributed to a fall in occupancy during the period following 
this peak. The government’s xenophobic ‘social evils’ campaign of 1995, a lack of repeat 
visitors, irregularity in visa regulation and enforcement and the Asian Economic Crisis of 
1998 all contributed to a drop in tourist arrivals to Vietnam during this period. Many joint 
venture hotels, begun in the boom years of the previous period, were opening at the same 
time. By 1999, there were seven international foreign joint venture hotels in Hanoi, with 
between 224 and 441 rooms each. Ho Chi Minh City also had seven such hotels, with 
between 248 and 552 rooms. This led to an oversupply of rooms in Ho Chi Minh City 
and Hanoi and a drastic fall in prices and occupancy rates. The greatest fall in prices 
came between 1996 and 1998. During these three years, room prices in one small private 
domestic-owned hotel with 17 rooms fell from US$ 70 to about US$ 25 a night 
(Respondent, Hotel B, personal communication, June 27, 2004). At the Daewoo joint 
venture hotel in Hanoi, the average room price fell from US$ 120 to US$ 80 in the same 
period. As a result, many small private hotels went bankrupt (Biles, Lloyd, & Logan, 
1999, p. 18). Several interviewees stated that during the crisis, many state-owned hotels 
adopted pricing policies such as low/high season price differentiation and started 
programmes of promotion for the first time, following the example of foreign joint 
venture hotels.  
In May 1997, for the first time since doi moi, there was a drop in hotel occupancy 
rates in Vietnam. Occupancy fell to 52 percent in Hanoi and 48 percent in Ho Chi Minh 
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City (Lamb as cited in Biles, et al, 1999, p. 18). According to the Viet Nam News, 
though, the hotel occupancy rate had actually started to decline to a low of 40-45 percent 
in state-owned hotels and 25-30 percent in private hotels from January to September 
1996 (as cited in Logan, 1997, p. 175). Another source mentions that occupancy rates in 
four-star and five-star hotels were only 40 percent in 1997 and fell to 20 percent in 1998 
(“Vietnam-Hotel Business,” 1998). The Asian economic crisis, a lack of attractions in the 
cities, a low return tourist rate, complicated visa procedures and poor transport all 
contributed to this declining trend (Logan, 1997, p. 175). 
Domestic private hotels retained their position as primary provider of 
accommodation to the “backpacker” market. These hotels also remained the most 
informal accommodation niche. A 1997 survey of twelve private hotels in Bai Chay, 
Halong Bay, Quang Ninh Province, revealed that seven of the owners were still 
employed by state enterprises or were receiving state pensions. Nine of the hotels also 
served as the owner’s family’s home but only three of the hotels provided the family’s 
primary source of income. The narrow plots of state-owned land on which the hotels are 
built – often one storey at a time as funding allowed – were often acquired at below 
market prices by state employees, teachers, former soldiers, officials or state company 
employees (Nicholson, 1997, p. 30). The owner of one private guest house in Sapa is also 
the manager of the state-owned hotel across the street (DiGregorio, Pham, & Minako, 
1996, p. 5). Throughout the 1990s, however, operators in this sector remained on a 
precarious footing, due to a lack of land titling and unclear land rights laws, encouraging 
a rough-and-ready approach to business and a quest for quick profit (DiGregorio et al, p. 
iv). 
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In 1998, a policy of seasonal pricing was adopted at the Hoa Binh Hotel in Hanoi 
for the first time. Interviewed executives at several state-owned hotels have confirmed 
that lower room rates or special offers apply for Vietnamese guests, and that domestic 
tourists are targeted more aggressively during the international tourism low season. 
 
Period 5: 1999-present 
 
In 2000, there were 55,760 international standard rooms in hotels in Vietnam compared 
to 13,055 in 1992: a major increase of over 320 percent. The growth in accommodation 
has kept pace with the increase in tourist arrival numbers, which reached 2,428,735 in 
2003. Consequently, according to the VNAT, in 2002, the room occupancy rate still 
averaged 45 percent (Vietnam National Administration of Tourism, n.d.). In 2004, 
Vietnam had 85,381 rooms (Le, 2005). In that same year, it was forecast that Vietnam 
would have 130,000 rooms by 2010 (“Summary of Vietnam,” 2004).  
Visitor numbers to Vietnam have continued to increase steadily. Hotel room 
prices have also gradually increased, but have not reached pre-1996 levels. Only one big 
new joint venture hotel has been built in Ho Chi Minh City in this period, and none in 
Hanoi. Asian regional crises such as the SARS outbreak of 2003 and the avian flu of 
2004 had temporary effects on occupancy rates. A few of the state-owned hotels 
investigated in this study have begun to offer various added services such as travel 
agencies and massages, often provided by private individuals or companies renting space 
in a state-owned hotel, in order to meet tourist demand. To better deal with fluctuations in 
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international tourism demand, many hotels are trying to attract more domestic tourists 
through promotion within the country or arranging of events. 
The highest concentrations of hotel facilities in Vietnam are in Ho Chi Minh City 
and Hanoi. In 1999, there were 555 hotels in Ho Chi Minh City and 371 hotels in Hanoi 
(Government of Vietnam, 2000, p. 20). In 2002, Vietnam had a total of fourteen five-star 
hotels, six of which were in Ho Chi Minh City and another six in Hanoi (“Summary of 
Vietnam,” 2004). 
Hotel rooms in Vietnam were in oversupply from 1997 until at least the early 
2000s. Occupancy of hotels in Vietnam is still restricted in part by ‘bottlenecks’ in the 
transport system. The General Manager of the Hilton Hanoi Opera Hotel, , blamed a 
shortage of international flights into Hanoi, and the comparatively high price of those 
incoming flights that did exist, for stagnation in demand for Hanoi’s 3,000 five-star 
standard rooms. Despite a halving of average deluxe room rates from the original target 
of US$ 135 - 150 to as low as US$ 65 per night, the occupancy rate for five-star hotels 
rose only to 60 percent (Son, 2001). 
However, the accommodation provisions are at present not sufficient to satisfy 
demand at the busiest times of the year. According to a senior official of the Foreign 
Investment Agency of MPI, Vietnam still does not have enough rooms to meet the 
demand brought by such events as the recent ASEAN summit, which took place in Hanoi 
in September 2004. A news report issued soon after the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation) CEO summit in Hanoi in November, 2006 claimed that the city experienced 
a shortage of deluxe hotel rooms during the high season, meeting only 70 percent of 
demand during the peak period (“Ha Noi,” 2006). 
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According to data received from the General Statistical Office in Hanoi, the 
number of hotels owned by private enterprises now surpasses the number of state-owned 
hotels, though private enterprise hotels tend to be very small-scale compared to state-
owned hotels. For example, in 2000, there were 2,846 hotels in Vietnam, of which 867 
were owned by state enterprises, 257 by joint ventures and 1,722 by private enterprises 
(“Summary of Vietnam,” 2004). Data obtained from the VNAT and General Statistical 
Office, (GSO) shows that state enterprise ownership still prevails among hotels with star-
rating status, but not in the hotel sector as a whole. Under-reporting of room provisions is 
also more prevalent among private-owned accommodation. Nicholson estimated that the 
private sector hotel rooms in Bai Chay, Halong Bay, may have been underestimated by as 
much as 60 percent because of rooms that were not reported to avoid taxation (Nicholson, 
1997, p. 30). 
Many international hotel chains had opened hotels in Vietnam by 2001, and many 
of the hotels in Vietnam’s larger cities were operated by Vietnamese/foreign joint 
ventures (VNAT, 2001, p. 41). The scale and budget of tourism accommodation projects 
in Vietnam continues to increase. An American asset management company has applied 
for a license for the construction of a US$ 1 billion resort and entertainment complex on 
the island of Phu Quoc (Vietnam National Administration of Tourism [VNAT], 2006). 
 
Current Issues and Future Outlook 
 
The joint-venture accommodation sector continues to expand. For instance, Accor plans 
to open four new hotels in Vietnam by 2008, in addition to the nine that it already has 
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(Strauss, 2007). Despite the growth of FDI in Vietnam’s accommodation sector, most 
new hotels developed in Vietnam are state-owned, often as joint ventures with foreign 
investors (VNAT, 2001, p. 45). In the majority of cases, especially in cities, the hotels are 
owned by, and provide a major source of income for, city and provincial tourism bodies. 
(Travel Business Analyst, 1992, p. 13). Sixty percent of the one- to five-star grade hotels 
and 65 percent of all hotel rooms in Vietnam belonged to SOEs (State-Owned 
Enterprises) in 2001. The owning state bodies ranged from national ministries to district 
and commune-level agencies. The predominance of state ownership of hotels has been 
seen as a mechanism of built-in government regulation in the accommodation industry 
(VNAT, 2001, p. 109, 159). However, the diffusion of control over different levels and 
bodies of government mitigates the effectiveness and homogeneity of policies that was 
possible within the former centrally controlled market. 
State-owned accommodation providers had a strategic advantage over the private 
operators just entering the Vietnamese market in the post-doi moi period by virtue of their 
possession of a number of well-located, established hotels in historic buildings in the 
urban centres of Vietnam. However, the competition of foreign joint venture hotels has 
inspired state hotels to improve their profitability, standards of service and facilities. 
Many state-owned hotels have been renovated or have moved into newly-built buildings 
to keep abreast of the demand of the international market. The cessation of direct 
government support compels these accommodation providers to operate differently than 
in pre-doi moi years, heralding a change in their management and service culture. 
As mentioned, some state hotels are adding amenities such as massage and travel 
services, to supplement the room-only offering of pre-doi moi. Small private operators 
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will commonly offer services and run galleries, clubs and other businesses inside state-
owned hotels, paying rent to the hotel and thereby supplementing its income 
(Respondent, Hotel C, personal communication, June 24, 2004). 
A continuation of dual private and public ownership has been endorsed in the 
‘Revised National Tourism Plan for Vietnam 2001-2010, Draft Report’, which also calls 
for a careful thinking-through of privatisation, including the establishment of requisite 
regulatory systems and bodies. However, the same report also mentions other modes of 
wholly-private, wholly-state or public/private ownership, including the ‘equitization’ of 
state enterprises by sale of shares, the sale or transfer of some entire SOEs to private 
interests, the liquidation of non-performing SOEs and the restructuring of remaining 
government enterprises to enhance their autonomy and accountability (2001, p. 159). 
Joint-venture hotels are able to offer bonuses such as discounts at their other 
hotels, by virtue of their global connections, their years of experience and economies of 
scale. They are also better equipped to deal with international bookings and tracking-
down non-paying guests. Because state-owned hotels are restricted to ventures inside of 
Vietnam, they cannot compete with the newcomers in these aspects (Respondent, Hotel 
A, personal communication, May 24, 2004). Thus, state-owned hotels must capitalise on 
their own natural advantages. The low prices offered by state-owned hotels offset their 
lower standards of facilities and service and constitute an advantage against the 
competition (Respondent, Hotel D, personal communication, May 30, 2004). This price 
difference is in part due to lower operating budgets because of lower provision of 
facilities and service, as well as the hiring of local staff rather than foreigners. Foreign 
training manuals and videos are used in at least one state-owned hotel, to indoctrinate 
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staff in international service standards (Respondent, Hotel E, personal communication, 
May 11, 2004). In recognition of the importance of environmental issues when marketing 
to Western guests, the Rex Hotel spent two years preparing for the environmental 
certificate ISO14001, which it received in 2004 (Respondent, Rex Hotel, personal 
communication, May 13, 2004).  The Continental Hotel became the second hotel in 
Vietnam to receive the ISO 14001 environmental certificate in that same year 
(“Continental Hotel,” n.d.) and the Majestic Hotel has also started working towards this 
certification. 
Older state-owned hotels are undergoing renovations and improvements to keep 
up with the international market. The 4-star Rex Hotel in Ho Chi Minh City is completing 
a new 70-room 5-star hotel, with a 1000-person conference hall, parking and pool 
(Respondent, Rex Hotel, personal communication, May 13, 2004). The municipal 
People’s Committee, which has provided a 3,000 square meter site is investing up to 
VND 300 billion (US$ 19.4 million) for construction of the new building (Son, 2003). 
Inner-city state-run hotels may be frustrated in their ambitions to upgrade due to site 
constraints. The Continental Hotel in the centre of Ho Chi Minh City has no space to 
provide new facilities such as parking or a swimming pool, and the hotel’s large street-
side windows are kept closed to keep out noise and pollution, but guests still complain. 
Some outdated state-owned hotels in Hanoi are slated to be demolished to make way for 
new four-to-five-star accommodation (Respondent, Hotel C, personal communication, 
June 24, 2004).  
 
Conclusion 
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The opening of Vietnam’s tourism accommodation market to foreign direct investment 
and domestic private entrepreneurs has brought about competition, consolidation and 
differentiation in the accommodation sector that was absent under the previous state 
monopoly. A more intensively-trained workforce and an orientation towards customer-
responsiveness are required to serve this more differentiated and discerning market, and 
Vietnam’s accommodation providers are increasingly concerned with meeting 
international standards. 
Vietnam’s current political transition has influenced the accommodation sector in 
a number of ways. The open door policy is to a large extent the primary cause of 
Vietnam’s increasing attractiveness as a leisure and business destination in recent years, 
and also the resulting rapid growth in numbers of tourists in Vietnam. Parallel to this 
quantitatively-measurable growth, qualitatively different types of tourists have begun to 
enter the country during this time. The small groups of political and industrial tourists 
from COMECON countries during the pre-doi moi years have been replaced by a much 
wider variety of visitors, in terms of their origins, travelling budgets and expectations.  
The Vietnamese government’s eagerness to enter into the global community of 
nations so long denied it is evinced by Vietnam’s recent admission to ASEAN, and WTO 
aspirations. The accommodation sector is directly affected by investment law reforms and 
other legislation passed in order to meet the requirements of entry into these 
organisations. The involvement of organisations like WTO and the UNDP in Vietnam 
introduces a global perspective to tourism planning, inspiring the drafting of the 
country’s first Tourism Law (2006). 
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Many aspects of the development of tourism businesses in Vietnam in the doi moi 
period can be seen as results of the interactions between state-owned, domestic private 
and foreign joint venture operators in the industry since the latter two became active in 
Vietnam in the late 1980s. The government relinquished its monopoly on tourism 
enterprises in order to encourage the growth of a free market within which state-owned 
firms competed alongside private sector businesses. Foreign joint ventures have brought 
international standards to Vietnamese tourism and thereby brought new impetus for 
improvement to domestic and state businesses. Through their small scale, flexibility and 
resourcefulness, private entrepreneurs are able to find and fill niches not served by the 
larger state and FDI firms, and also play a role in incubating forms of tourism businesses 
that may be later taken up by government or foreign operators. All three types of firms 
are affected by factors such as government regulation, the quality of available human 
resources and infrastructure. State, foreign and domestic private tourism enterprises all 
play roles in influencing and directing changes in these and other factors in Vietnamese 
society that influence their operating environment. 
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